Secure UAV Communication with Cooperative Jamming and Trajectory Control by Zhong, Canhui et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
81
2.
06
81
3v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
7 D
ec
 20
18
1
Secure UAV Communication with Cooperative
Jamming and Trajectory Control
Canhui Zhong, Jianping Yao, and Jie Xu
Abstract—This paper presents a new cooperative jamming
approach to secure the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) com-
munication by leveraging jamming from other nearby UAVs to
defend against the eavesdropping. In particular, we consider
a two-UAV scenario when one UAV transmitter delivers the
confidential information to a ground node (GN), and the other
UAV jammer cooperatively sends artificial noise (AN) to confuse
the ground eavesdropper for protecting the confidentiality of the
data transmission. By exploiting the fully-controllable mobility,
the two UAVs can adaptively adjust their locations over time
(a.k.a. trajectories) to facilitate the secure communication and
cooperative jamming. We assume that the two UAVs perfectly
know the GN’s location and partially know the eavesdropper’s
location a-priori. Under this setup, we maximize the average
secrecy rate from the UAV transmitter to the GN over one
particular time period, by optimizing the UAVs’ trajectories,
jointly with their communicating/jamming power allocations.
Although the formulated problem is non-convex, we propose
an efficient solution by applying the techniques of alternating
optimization and successive convex approximation (SCA).
Index Terms—Secure UAV communication, cooperative jam-
ming, trajectory design, power allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communications have at-
tracted growing research interests in both academia and indus-
try, in order to provide UAVs with not only low-latency and re-
liable command and control, but also application-specific high-
speed data transmission [1], [2]. However, due to the strong
line-of-sight (LoS) air-to-ground wireless links, UAV commu-
nications face more stringent security issues than conventional
terrestrial communication systems, as UAVs’ transmit signals
are more likely to be overheard by suspicious eavesdroppers
over a large area on the ground. Therefore, how to ensure
the confidentiality of UAV communications against malicious
eavesdropping attacks is a challenging task to be tackled.
Recently, physical-layer security has emerged as a promis-
ing solution to secure UAV communications against eaves-
dropping attacks (e.g., [3]–[9]). For example, [3], [4] studied
a secure single-UAV communication system with one UAV
communicating with a ground node (GN) in the presence of
suspicious eavesdroppers on the ground. The authors proposed
to adaptively control the UAV’s location over time (a.k.a. tra-
jectory) jointly with the transmit power allocation to maximize
the UAV’s average secrecy rate over a finite mission period. By
exploiting the trajectory design, the UAV can fly towards the
intended GN to enhance the communication quality and move
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far apart from the eavesdroppers to reduce the information
leakage, thus significantly improving the secrecy rate. Fur-
thermore, [5], [6] proposed to use UAVs as friendly jammers
to secure the ground wireless communication, while [7], [8]
considered to employ UAVs as mobile relays to facilitate
secure or reliable wireless communications. In addition, the
authors in [9] analyzed the secrecy performance of a large
UAV-enabled millimeter wave (mmWave) network, where a
large number of randomly deployed UAVs act as flying BSs
to serve users on the ground.
Different from prior works, in this paper we propose a new
inter-UAV cooperative jamming approach to secure the UAV
communication, by allowing other nearby UAVs to coopera-
tively send jamming signals for confusing potential eavesdrop-
pers. For ease of exposition, we consider a basic two-UAV
scenario when one UAV transmitter sends information to a
GN and the other UAV jammer generates artificial noise (AN)
to jam a suspicious eavesdropper on the ground. By exploiting
the fully-controllable mobility, the two UAVs can adaptively
adjust their trajectories, together with the wireless resource
allocation, to facilitate the secure communication and cooper-
ative jamming. It is assumed that the UAVs perfectly know the
GN’s location and partially know the eavesdropper’s location
a-priori. Under this setup, we maximize the average secrecy
rate from the UAV transmitter to the GN by optimizing the two
UAVs’ trajectories, jointly with the communicating/jamming
power allocations over time. Although this problem is non-
convex and generally difficult to solve, we obtain a high-
quality solution efficiently via employing the techniques of
alternating optimization and successive convex approximation
(SCA). Numerical results show that the proposed design sig-
nificantly improves the secrecy rate performance, as compared
to other benchmark schemes.
Note that the proposed cooperative jamming design for
secure UAV communications is different from that in con-
ventional secure terrestrial communication systems (see, e.g.,
[10]). While conventional designs employed wireless resource
allocations for optimizing the security performance, this paper
additionally exploits the UAVs’ controllable mobility via tra-
jectory design for further performance improvement. Also note
that this paper is different from the interesting parallel work
[11] on the UAV-aided secrecy communications. In particular,
[11] considered the deterministic secrecy rate maximization
by assuming perfect knowledge of eavesdropper’s location at
UAVs, while this paper studies the worst-case secrecy rate
maximization by considering the uncertainty of such informa-
tion. Therefore, the optimization approaches and insights are
significantly different from those in [11].
2II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider that a UAV transmitter (UAV 1) delivers confi-
dential information to a GN and the other UAV jammer (UAV
2) cooperatively sends AN to confuse an on-ground suspicious
eavesdropper. Without loss of generality, we consider a three-
dimensional (3D) Cartesian coordinate system, in which the
GN and the eavesdropper are located on the ground with
altitude zero, and horizontal locations w0 and we ∈ R
2×1,
respectively. It is assumed that the two UAVs perfectly know
the GN locationw0 via proper information exchange, and par-
tially know the eavesdropper location we by e.g. monitoring
its potential information leakage [12]. More specifically, let w˜e
denote the estimated eavesdropper location by the two UAVs.
We consider a bounded eavesdropper location error model with
ǫ denoting the maximum estimation error that is known by the
UAVs. Accordingly, we havewe∈Θ,{||w˜e−we||≤ǫ}, where
||·|| denotes the Euclidean norm.
We focus on a particular UAV mission/flight period with
duration T , which is discretized into N time slots with equal
duration ts=T/N . The two UAVs fly at two given altitudes
H1 andH2, respectively, which are pre-determined properly to
avoid their collision.1 For each UAV i∈{1, 2}, let qi[n] denote
its horizontal location at slot n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and qi[0] and
qi[N+1] denote its initial and final locations, respectively. Let
V˜i denote the maximum speed of UAV i∈{1, 2}, and Vi= V˜its
denote the maximum displacement of that UAV between two
consecutive slots. It then follows that
||qi[n+1]−qi[n]|| ≤ Vi, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, n∈{0, . . . , N}. (1)
In practice, the air-to-ground wireless channels are dom-
inated by the LoS link. As commonly adopted in the UAV
communication literature [3], [4], [6], [7], we adopt the free-
space wireless channel model, in which the channel power
gain from UAV i to the GN at slot n is given by
gi[n] =
β0
d2i,0[n]
=
β0
||qi[n]−w0||
2 +H2i
, (2)
where β0 denotes the channel power gain at the reference
distance of 1 m and di,0[n] =
√
||qi[n]−w0||
2 +H2i is the
distance from UAV i to the GN at slot n. Similarly, the channel
power gain from UAV i to the eavesdropper at slot n is
hi[n] =
β0
d2i,e[n]
=
β0
||qi[n]−we||
2 +H2i
, (3)
where di,e[n] =
√
||qi[n]−we||
2 +H2i is the distance from
UAV i to the eavesdropper at slot n.
Next, we consider the cooperative jamming between the
two UAVs. At time slot n, let p1[n] and p2[n] denote the
transmit power by UAV 1 for communication and UAV 2 for
cooperative jamming, respectively. Then, the achievable rates
1Our results are extendible to the case when the two UAVs fly at the same
altitude, by taking into account the minimum inter-UAV distance constraints
for collision avoidance.
from UAV 1 to the GN and the eavesdropper (in bps/Hz) at
slot n are respectively given as
r0[n] = log2
(
1 +
g1[n]p1[n]
g2[n]p2[n] + σ2
)
, (4)
re[n] = log2
(
1 +
h1[n]p1[n]
h2[n]p2[n] + σ2
)
. (5)
Notice that each UAV only partially knows the eavesdropper
location we. We are interested in the worst-case secrecy rate
from UAV 1 to the GN for each slot n, which is given by
R[n] =
[
r0[n]− max
we∈Θ
re[n]
]+
, (6)
where [x]+,max(x,0). Furthermore, suppose that each UAV i
is subject to a maximum average powerPave and a maximum
peak powerPpeak. Then we have
1
N
N∑
n=1
pi[n] ≤ Pave, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, (7a)
pi[n] ≤ Ppeak, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (7b)
Our objective is to maximize the average secrecy rate from
UAV 1 to the GN over the whole period, by jointly optimizing
the UAV trajectory {qi[n]} and the transmit power allocation
{pi[n]}, subject to the trajectory constraints in (1) and the
power constraints in (7). The problem of interest is formally
formulated as
(P1) : max
{q
i
[n],pi[n]}
1
N
N∑
n=1
R[n], s.t. (1) and (7). (8)
Notice that the objective function in problem (P1) is a non-
smooth (due to the operator [·]+) and non-concave function
involving a “max” operation (i.e., max
we∈Θ
re[n]). Therefore,
problem (P1) is a non-convex optimization problem that is
difficult to be optimally solved in general.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO PROBLEM (P1)
In this section, we propose an efficient solution to prob-
lem (P1). First, to facilitate the derivation, we approximate
max
we∈Θ
re[n] in the objective function as an explicit function.
Notice that we havemax
we∈Θ
h1[n]=h˜1[n]=
β0
(||q1[n]−w˜e||−ǫ)
2
+H21
,
and min
we∈Θ
h2[n]= h˜2[n]=
β0
(||q2[n]−w˜e||+ǫ)
2
+H22
, where h˜1[n]
corresponds to the best channel power gain from UAV 1 to
the eavesdropper that is attained atwe[n]=w˜e+
q1[n]−w˜e
||q1[n]−w˜e||
ǫ,
and h˜2[n] corresponds to the worst channel power gain from
UAV 2 to the eavesdropper that is attained at we[n]=w˜e−
q2[n]−w˜e
||q2[n]−w˜e||
ǫ. Therefore, it is evident that
max
we∈Θ
re[n] ≤ r˜e[n] = log2
(
1 +
h˜1[n]p1[n]
h˜2[n]p2[n] + σ2
)
, (9)
where r˜e[n] corresponds to an upper bound of the achievable
rate from UAV 1 to the eavesdropper. By replacing max
we∈Θ
re[n]
as r˜e[n] in (9), we obtain a lower bound of the secrecy rate
of UAV 1 at slot n as R˜[n] = [r0[n]− r˜e[n]]
+
. Therefore,
3instead of directly maximizing 1
N
∑N
n=1R[n] in (P1), we
propose to maximize the explicit and mathematically tractable
function 1
N
∑N
n=1 R˜[n] to obtain a lower bound for UAV 1’s
secrecy rate. Furthermore, it is worth noting that, according
to Lemma 1 in [3], the optimization with transmit power
allocation always leads to a non-negative secrecy rate at each
time slot. Therefore, we can equivalently omit the [·]+ operator
in the objective function for the secrecy rate maximization. As
such, we approximate problem (P1) as the following problem:
(P2) : max
{q
i
[n],pi[n]}
1
N
N∑
n=1
R¯[n], s.t. (1) and (7), (10)
where R¯[n] = r0[n]− r˜e[n], n ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Next, we focus on solving the approximate problem (P2),
which, however, is still non-convex. To tackle this issue, we
use the alternating optimization method to optimize the trans-
mit power allocation {pi[n]} and UAV trajectories {qi[n]} in
an alternating manner, by considering the other to be given.
A. Transmit Power Allocation
First, we optimize the transmit power allocation {pi[n]} un-
der given UAV trajectories {qi[n]}, for which the optimization
problem is expressed as
max
{pi[n]}
1
N
N∑
n=1
R¯[n], s.t. (7), (11)
whereR¯[n]can be expressed in a concave-minus-concave form
as
R¯[n] = log2
(
σ
2 + g1[n]p1[n] + g2[n]p2[n]
)
+ log2
(
σ
2 + h˜2[n]p2[n]
)
− log2
(
σ
2 + g2[n]p2[n]
)
− log2
(
σ
2 + h˜1[n]p1[n] + h˜2[n]p2[n]
)
. (12)
As R¯[n] is a non-concave function with respect to {pi[n]},
problem (11) is still a non-convex optimization problem. To
tackle this issue, we apply the SCA technique to obtain a
converged solution in an iterative manner. At each iteration
m ≥ 1, suppose that the local transmit power point is
given as {p
(m)
i [n]}. Then we approximate R¯[n] as a lower
bound R¯(m)[n] in the following by using the first-order Taylor
expansion.
R¯[n] ≥ R¯(m)[n] , log2
(
σ
2 + g1[n]p1[n] + g2[n]p2[n]
)
(13)
+log2
(
σ
2+h˜2[n]p2[n]
)
−
h˜1[n]
(
p1[n]− p
(m)
1 [n]
)
ln 2
(
σ2+h˜1[n]p
(m)
1 [n]+h˜2[n]p
(m)
2 [n]
)
−
g2[n]
(
p2[n]−p
(m)
2 [n]
)
ln 2
(
σ2+g2[n]p
(m)
2 [n]
)− h˜2[n]
(
p2[n]− p
(m)
2 [n]
)
ln 2
(
σ2+h˜1[n]p
(m)
1 [n]+h˜2[n]p
(m)
2 [n]
)
−log2
(
σ
2+g2[n]p
(m)
2 [n]
)
−log2
(
σ
2+h˜1[n]p
(m)
1 [n]+h˜2[n]p
(m)
2 [n]
)
.
By replacing R¯[n] as R¯(m)[n], problem (11) is approximated
as a convex optimization problem that can thus be solved
by standard convex optimization techniques such as CVX
[11]. Then, at each iteration (m + 1), we set the local
point {p
(m+1)
i [n]} as the optimal solution to the approximate
problem in the previous iterationm. As the iteration converges,
we can obtain a converged solution to problem (11).
B. UAV Trajectory Design
Next, we optimize the UAV trajectory {qi[n]} under given
transmit power allocation {pi[n]}, for which the problem is
expressed as
max
{q
i
[n]}
1
N
N∑
n=1
R¯[n], s.t. (1). (14)
By introducing auxiliary variables {ζ[n]}, {ξ[n]} and
{τ [n]}, we re-express problem (14) equivalently as
max
{q
i
[n],ζ[n],ξ[n],τ [n]}
1
N
N∑
n=1
Rˆ[n],
s.t. ζ[n]≤||q2[n]−w0||
2 +H22 ,∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (15a)
ξ[n]≤ (||q1[n]− w˜e||−ǫ)
2+H21 ,∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (15b)
τ [n] ≤ (||q2[n]− w˜e||+ǫ)
2+H22 ,∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (15c)
ζ[n]≥H22 , ξ[n]≥H
2
1 , τ [n]≥H
2
2+ǫ
2
,∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (15d)
(1),
where
Rˆ[n]=−log2
(
σ
2+
β0p2[n]
ζ[n]
)
−log2
(
σ
2+
β0p1[n]
ξ[n]
+
β0p2[n]
τ [n]
)
(16)
+ log2
(
σ
2+h˜2[n]p2[n]
)
+log2
(
σ
2+g1[n]p1[n]+g2[n]p2[n]
)
.
Notice that the constraints in (15a), (15b), and (15c) are non-
convex, as their right-hand-side (RHS) terms are all convex.
Also, Rˆ[n] in the objective function is non-concave, as the
third and fourth terms are convex functions with respect to
{qi[n]}. Therefore, problem (15) is non-convex. To tackle the
non-convexity, we apply the SCA technique to solve problem
(15) in an iterative way. Given a local UAV trajectory point
{q
(m)
i [n]} at iteration m ≥ 1, we have the approximate
constraints and objective functions as follows based on the
first-order Taylor expansion.
ζ[n]−||q
(m)
2 [n]−w0||
2−2(q
(m)
2 [n]−w0)
T×
(
q2[n]− q
(m)
2 [n]
)
≤ H22 , ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (17a)
ξ[n]−||q
(m)
1 [n]− w˜e||
2−2(q
(m)
1 [n] − w˜e)
T×
(
q1[n]− q
(m)
1 [n]
)
≤−2ǫ||q1[n]−w˜e||+ǫ
2 +H21 ,∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (17b)
τ [n]−ǫ2−H22−||q
(m)
2 [n]−w˜e||
2−2
(
q
(m)
2 [n]−w˜e+
q
(m)
2 [n]−w˜e
||q
(m)
2 [n]−w˜e||
ǫ
)T
×
(
q2[n]−q
(m)
2 [n]
)
≤2ǫ||q
(m)
2 [n]−w˜e||,∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (17c)
Rˆ[n]≥ Rˆ(m)[n],−log2
(
σ
2+
β0p2[n]
ζ[n]
)
−log2
(
σ
2+
β0p1[n]
ξ[n]
+
β0p2[n]
τ [n]
)
+a
(
||q2[n]−w0||
2−||q
(m)
2 [n]−w0||
2
)
+b
(
||q1[n]−w0||
2−||q
(m)
1 [n]−w0||
2
)
+c
(
(||q2[n]−w˜e||+ǫ)
2−
(
||q
(m)
2 [n]−w˜e||+ǫ
)2)
+ d, (17d)
4where a = −
g22 [n]p2[n]
ln 2β0(σ2+g1[n]p1[n]+g2[n]p2[n])
, b =
−
g21 [n]p1[n]
ln 2β0(σ2+g1[n]p1[n]+g2[n]p2[n])
, c = −
h˜22[n]p2[n]
ln 2β0(σ2+h˜2[n]p2[n])
,
and d=log2
(
σ2+ β0p2[n](
||q
(m)
2 [n]−w˜e||+ǫ
)2
+H22
)
+log2
(
σ2+
β0p1[n]
||q
(m)
1 [n]−w0||
2+H2
i
+ β0p2[n]
||q
(m)
2 [n]−w0||
2+H2
i
)
. Replacing Rˆ[n],
(15a), (15b), and (15c) with Rˆ(m)[n], (17a), (17b), and (17c),
respectively, problem (15) is equivalently expressed as the
following convex optimization problem that can be efficiently
solved by CVX.
max
{q
i
[n],ζ[n],ξ[n],τ [n]}
1
N
N∑
n=1
Rˆ(m)[n], (18)
s.t. (17a), (17b), (17c), (15d) and (1).
By iteratively updating the local UAV trajectory point
{q
(m)
i [n]} at the (m + 1)-th iteration as the optimal solution
to the approximate problem in the previous iteration m, we
can obtain a converged solution to problem (14).
To sum up, we solve for the transmit power {pi[n]} and
the trajectory {qi[n]} in an alternating manner above, and
accordingly, we obtain an efficient solution to problem (P2).
As the objective value of problem (P2) is monotonically non-
decreasing after each iteration and the objective value of
problem (P2) is finite, the proposed alternating optimization
based algorithm is guaranteed to converge [1], [13]. In Section
IV, we will conduct simulations to show the effectiveness of
the proposed algorithm.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results to verify the
performance of our proposed design. For comparison, we
consider a heuristic UAV trajectory design, namely the fly-
hover-fly trajectory. In this design, each of the two UAVs
first flies straightly at the maximum speed from the initial
location to the respective hovering location (above the GN to
help communication for UAV 1 and above the eavesdropper
to facilitate jamming for UAV 2, respectively), then hovers
with the maximum duration, and finally flies straightly at their
maximum speed to the final location. Based on the fly-hover-
fly trajectory, we consider both constant power allocation (i.e.,
pi[n] = Pave, ∀i, n) and adaptive power allocation (i.e., by
solving problem (11) under given trajectory). Furthermore, for
our proposed design, we use the fly-hover-fly trajectory with
constant power allocation as the initial point for optimization.
In the simulation, we set w0=(0, 0), w˜e=(200 m, 0), H1=
100 m, H2=110 m, V1=V2=10 m/s, Pave=30 dBm, Ppeak=
4Pave, ǫ=10 m, β0/σ
2=80 dB, q1[0]= q2[0]=(100 m, 500 m),
and q1[N + 1]=q2[N + 1]=(100 m,−500 m).
Fig. 1 shows the obtained trajectories of two UAVs by our
proposed design, under mission duration T=102 s, T=104
s, and T=200 s, respectively. It is observed that when T is
large (e.g., T=200 s), the two UAVs first fly to the hovering
locations (that are close to but slightly away from the GN
or the eavesdropper, respectively) following arc paths, then
hover there with longest duration, and finally fly to the final
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locations in symmetric arc paths. Intuitively, staying at the
corresponding hovering location, UAV 1 can achieve the best
secrecy communication performance by effectively balancing
between the desirable information transmission to the GN
versus undesirable information leakage to the eavesdropper,
while UAV 2 can achieve the best cooperative jamming per-
formance by balancing between the desirable jamming towards
the eavesdropper versus the undesirable interference with the
GN. By contrast, it is also observed that when T becomes
T = 102 s or 104 s, the two UAVs fly at the maximum
speed towards the hovering locations as close as possible, but
they cannot exactly reach there due to the time and speed
limitations. It is expected that as T increase, the UAVs can fly
closer towards their respective hovering locations and hover
there with longer durations, thus leading to higher average
achievable secrecy rates, as illustrated next.
Fig. 2 shows the average achievable secrecy rate versus
mission duration T . For comparison, we also consider the case
with perfect eavesdropper location information, i.e., ǫ=0 m.
It is observed that as T increases, the secrecy rates achieved
by all the four schemes increase, as the two UAVs can stay
longer at the corresponding hovering locations for better com-
munication/jamming performance as explained above. When
T is small (e.g. T=102 s), our proposed design is observed
to have a similar performance as the fly-hover-fly trajectory
with adaptive power allocation. This is due to the fact that
in this case, the block duration is only sufficient for the two
UAVs to fly from the initial to final locations, and there is
no additional time to adjust the trajectory for communication
performance optimization. When T becomes large, the pro-
5posed design is observed to significantly outperform the two
benchmark schemes with fly-hover-fly trajectory. Furthermore,
it is observed that there is only a slight performance gap be-
tween the proposed design with perfect eavesdropper location
information (ǫ=0 m) versus that with imperfect eavesdropper
location information (ǫ=10 m). This shows the effectiveness
of our proposed approximation.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we presented a new cooperative jamming ap-
proach to secure the UAV communication, by enabling another
nearby UAV to cooperatively jam the potential eavesdropper
on the ground. By exploiting the UAVs’ controllable mobility,
we maximized the average secrecy rate by optimizing the
UAVs’ trajectories, jointly with their transmit power allo-
cations. How to extend the results to other scenarios, e.g.,
with multiple UAVs and multiple antennas, are interesting
directions worth further investigation.
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